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Footnotes 
1. See generally NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF
APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION (1991).
2. It is worth noting that, empirically, it is not clear whether, under
what circumstances, or to what degree an apology might alter the
risk of an adverse liability determination.  Whether apologies
influence liability decision making in civil cases has not been
examined in empirical studies.  On one hand, in the criminal con-
text, confession evidence has been shown to exert a powerful
effect on decision making.  See e.g., Saul Kassin & Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the
Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33 (2004); Saul M.
Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession
Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference
Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (1997).  On the other
hand, studies examining attributions of responsibility in nonlegal
contexts have found that offenders who apologize are seen as hav-
ing acted less intentionally and are blamed less. See e.g., Steven J.
Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to
Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J.
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127 (1997).
3. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes
Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On
Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002); Aviva
Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into
Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV.
221 (1999); Daniel Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83
JUDICATURE 180 (2000); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 233, § 23D (West 1986).
When one person allegedly injures another, he or shewill often attempt to provide an account for theconduct that led to the injury.  Specifically, he or she
might attempt to disavow, explain, excuse, or justify the behav-
ior that purportedly led to the injury.  Alternately, he or she
might offer an apology to the injured person.  Apologies can be
distinguished from other forms of accounting in that they
acknowledge responsibility for the conduct that caused the
harm.  Accepting blame and expressing regret for one’s behav-
ior signals a recognition of the norm or rule that was violated
and of the harm caused to the other.1
Such acknowledgment can be complicated in the context of
litigation.  When the offense is such that it raises the possible
involvement of the legal system, defendants, defense counsel,
and insurance companies have traditionally worried that apol-
ogizing will only make things worse for the defendant; specifi-
cally, that any apology will be viewed as an admission and will
lead to more certain legal liability.2 Indeed, there is evidence
that although civil defendants, such as physicians in medical
malpractice cases, may sometimes desire to offer apologies, they
are also concerned that disclosure or acceptance of responsibil-
ity would increase the possibility for legal liability.3
As a general matter, of course, an apology by a party to liti-
gation is potentially admissible under the exception to the
hearsay rule that allows admission of a party’s own statements.
Other rules of evidence may prevent the admission of certain
apologetic statements in some circumstances – for example,
statements made in settlement discussions may be protected
under Rule 408.  However, apologies that are made outside of
these contexts are potentially admissible.  Consequently, many
defendants avoid apologizing and are so counseled by their
attorneys and insurers.
Despite the potential risks, however, there has been growing
interest in the possibility that clients might benefit, legally and
otherwise, from apologizing.4 Indeed, empirical studies exam-
ining the impact of apologies in a variety of contexts have
demonstrated a range of positive effects that flow from apolo-
gizing.  These effects include more favorable attributions, more
positive and less negative emotion for both apologizer and
recipient, improved physiological responses for both parties,
improved future relations, decreased need to punish, and more
likely forgiveness.  In addition to the potential physical, psy-
chological, and relational benefits of apologies, commentators
have argued that apologies have the potential to facilitate the
settlement of legal disputes—breaking impasse to allow pro-
ductive negotiation, allowing resolution to occur more quickly,
addressing parties’ non-legal concerns, or resulting in financial
settlement terms that are more favorable to the one who has
apologized.
Some proponents of encouraging apologies in litigation
have considered how defendants who desire to apologize
might do so “safely” given the patchwork of evidentiary pro-
tection traditionally available.  One recommendation has been
that defendants consider offering statements that express sym-
pathy for the other party, but that stop short of admitting
responsibility for having caused injury (i.e., “I’m sorry you
were hurt” rather than “I am sorry I hurt you.”).  These sym-
pathetic expressions are not complete apologies by most defi-
nitions—lacking, in particular, an acknowledgment of respon-
sibility for the behavior that led to the harm.  However, it is
argued that by offering  at least an expression of sympathy,
defendants can reap some of the benefits of apologizing while
simultaneously minimizing any increase in liability risk.
Concurrently, many states have recently enacted statutes
that are intended to encourage and protect certain apologetic
expressions by making them inadmissible in court.
Massachusetts enacted the first statute preventing the admis-
sion of some apologies in 1986.5 Since then, over two-thirds
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of the states have followed suit and have enacted statutes that
explicitly provide some apologies with evidentiary protection
(see Appendix).   Many of these statutes apply to civil litiga-
tion generally; others apply specifically to cases of medical
error.  In addition, these statutes vary as to the type of apolo-
getic statements that are protected.  For example, some
statutes only prevent the admission of those statements that
express sympathy (i.e., “I’m sorry that you were hurt.”), while
preserving the admissibility of any statement that acknowl-
edges fault (i.e., “It was my fault.”).  Other statutes have gone
further, also providing protection to statements that express
“fault,” “error,” or “mistake.”  Still other statutes protect
“apologies” without clearly defining the term.
Proponents of these protected apologies suggest that if the
law prevents the admission of apologetic expressions, defen-
dants will be more likely to offer them.  However, whether
these apology statutes will result in more apologies and what
form such apologies might take are open empirical questions.
Many argue that apologies are impeded by the fear of litigation
generally, and the fear that an apology will increase the risk of
liability more specifically.  However, other cultural and psy-
chological barriers to apologizing operate as well.  Apologies
are difficult to make—admitting that one’s behavior has caused
harm and apologizing for it is embarrassing and injurious to
one’s pride.  Nancy Berlinger recognizes the role that these
other obstacles to apologies may play when she notes that
“merely protecting apologies is not the same as encouraging
them.  Genuine apologies are never fun to make.”6
Critics of providing evidentiary protection for apologies rec-
ognize the possibility that allowing apologies to be introduced
against the apologizer in a subsequent legal proceeding could
have a “chilling effect” on such expressions of remorse, but
argue that removing the legal consequences of apologizing
would diminish the moral content of the apology.7 Others,
however, argue that even legally protected apologies are
socially useful, can promote settlement, and should be encour-
aged (or at least not discouraged).
Recent empirical work has begun to explore the role of
apologies in the civil justice system and to examine the
nuances of the ways in which apologies may influence the res-
olution of legal disputes.  This body of work suggests that
apologies have a role to play in fostering settlement, but that
the complexities of the apologies, the context in which they are
offered, and whether the apology is being evaluated by a
claimant, attorney, or judge, may moderate the ways in which
apologies influence settlement.
I.  CLAIMANTS AND APOLOGIES
As an initial matter, people anticipate that they would desire
an apology if they were injured by another.  A number of stud-
ies have found that medical patients report that they would
want to receive an apology from their physician if the physi-
cian made a mistake.8 In addition, studies that have asked liti-
gants about their motives for bringing suit find that many of
these plaintiffs believe that an apology from the other side is
one factor that might have changed the course of the litiga-
tion.9
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• Statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to
the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an
accident and made to such person or to the family of
such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an
admission of liability in a civil action.  MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. CH. 233, § 23D (West 1986).
• The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent ges-
tures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevo-
lence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person
involved in an accident and made to that person or the
family of that person shall be inadmissible as evidence of
an admission of liability in a civil action.  A statement of
fault, however, which is part of, or in addition to, any of
the above shall not be inadmissible pursuant to this sec-
tion.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (2000).
• In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an
unanticipated outcome of medical care, or in any arbi-
tration proceeding relating to such civil action, any and
all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct
expressing apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration, con-
dolence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence
which are made by a health care provider or an employee
of a health care provider to the alleged victim, or a rep-
resentative of the alleged victim and which relate to the
discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or death of the alleged
victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome of med-
ical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admis-
sion of liability or as evidence of an admission against
interest.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003).
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THERAPY 253 (2001); Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk
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INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999).
11. See Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a
National Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73 (2003); Virginia L. Morrison,
Heyoka: The Shifting Shape of Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 21
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 931 (2005); Rachel Zimmerman, Medical
Contrition: Doctors’ New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying ‘I’m Sorry,’
WALL STREET J., May 18, 2004, at A1; see also Sorry Works!,
http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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13. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV.
107 (1994).
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Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003); Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 333 (2006).
Similarly, particular insti-
tutions have successfully
adopted polices of disclosing
errors, apologizing for them,
and compensating for the
resulting injuries.  For exam-
ple, at the Veterans Affairs
Medical Center in Lexington,
Kentucky, patients are
informed that there has been
an adverse event whether or
not they are already aware
that there has been an inci-
dent.  If the hospital deter-
mines that there has been an
error, an apology is proffered
and an offer of settlement made.  Since implementing this pol-
icy, the hospital reports that patients are less angry following
adverse events and are more likely to maintain a good rela-
tionship with the hospital. The hospital also reports that cases
settle more quickly, self-reporting of errors by the medical pro-
fessionals has increased, the hospital has received positive pub-
licity, and litigation costs have declined.10 Other institutions
(e.g., University of Michigan Health System, John’s Hopkins,
Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta, Sturdy Memorial Hospital in
Boston) as well as private insurers (e.g., COPIC) have adopted
similar policies and report similarly positive results.11
In addition to this data from the field, experimental research
has provided insight into the processes by which apologies can
influence the ways in which injured parties construe an injury-
producing incident and, thus, their willingness to settle.
Specifically, these experiments find that apologies influence a
variety of litigation related judgments and decisions, including
the inclination to seek legal advice, the positions taken in set-
tlement negotiations, and the likelihood of accepting a partic-
ular settlement offer.
In one study, Kathleen Mazor and her colleagues explored
patients’ decisions about whether to obtain legal advice fol-
lowing a medical injury.12 Members of an insurance plan were
asked to take the perspective of a patient who had been injured
by a medical error.  Participants were either told that following
the error the physician provided little information and did not
take responsibility for the error (the “nondisclosure” condi-
tion) or were told that the physician provided information
about what had happened, apologized, and took responsibility
for the error, and detailed steps that would be taken to prevent
recurrence (the “full disclosure” condition).  Patients who
were told that the physician had provided full disclosure and
an apology following the error expressed greater satisfaction
and fewer negative emotions, reported more trust in the physi-
cian, were less likely to indicate that they would change doc-
tors, and were less likely to indicate that they would seek legal
advice in response to the incident than were patients whose
physician had not disclosed and apologized.
Professors Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie conducted
an experimental investigation of the effects of an apology on
litigants’ settlement decisions in a landlord-tenant dispute.13
Participants were asked to assume the role of the tenant in a
dispute between a landlord and tenant over a broken heater
and to evaluate a particular offer of settlement from the land-
lord.  Participants who were told that the landlord had apolo-
gized to them were marginally more likely to accept the land-
lord’s offer than were participants who had not received an
apology.
Similarly, I conducted a series of studies to examine how
laypeople in the role of an injured party respond to apologies
in making settlement decisions.14 Participants were asked to
respond to a scenario in which they were injured in a bicycle-
pedestrian collision. The other party offered either a partial
apology, which consisted of an expression of sympathy but no
acceptance of responsibility, a full, responsibility-accepting
apology, or no apology.  Apologies, particularly those that
accepted responsibility for having caused injury, favorably
influenced a variety of attributions made about the situation
and the other party, including perceptions of the character of
and the degree of regret experienced by the other party, expec-
tations about the way in which the other party would behave
in the future, and expectations about the relationship between
the parties going forward.  Similarly, apologies influenced the
emotions that participants reported they would feel—decreas-
ing anger toward the other party and increasing sympathy for
the other’s position.  Full, responsibility-accepting apologies
showed these effects consistently.  Apologies that merely
expressed sympathy were more context dependent, favorably
influencing these attributions under some circumstances, but
not in others.
These studies also found that apologies influence judg-
ments that are directly related to legal-settlement decision
making.  Many studies have demonstrated that the value that
a negotiator sets as his or her reservation price (or “bottom-
line”), the negotiator’s aspirations, and the negotiator’s judg-
ment about what a fair settlement would entail, all influence
Since implementing
this policy, the 
hospital reports
that patients 
are less angry 
following adverse
events and are
more likely to
maintain a good
relationship with
the hospital.
15. Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 601, 609 (2005-2006).
16. See Edward C. Tomlinson et al., The Road to Reconciliation:
Antecedents of Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a Broken
Promise, 30 J. MGMT. 165 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Daniel P. Skarlicki et al., When Social Accounts Backfire:
The Exacerbating Effects of a Polite Message or an Apology on
Reactions to an Unfair Outcome, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 322
(2004).  See also Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra
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19. Compare WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 78 (2003) (arguing that
apologies are easy to “fake”) and Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse,
Apology, and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 423 (arguing that
remorse and repentance are easy to fake) with Orenstein, supra
note 4 (arguing that “the emotion of contrition is hard to fake in
person”).
20. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 14.
21. See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve said I’m sorry,
haven’t I?” A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints that
Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10
(1994); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer
Differences in the Acceptance of Questionable Apologies, 92  J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 418 (2007). 
22. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 19
(1993).
23. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlemen, supra note 14;
Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 14.  Note,
however, that an apology can be sincerely offered even though it
is subject to a rule protecting it.
final negotiated outcomes.  In my studies, there were circum-
stances under which claimants who received an apology had
lower aspirations and set lower values for their judgments
about what would be a fair settlement value.
Similarly, apologies influenced how individuals evaluated a
settlement offer in terms of its ability to make up for the harm
suffered, how they appraised their need to punish the other
party, and how they assessed their willingness to forgive the
other party.   Participants receiving apologies judged an offer as
being more adequate, felt less need to punish the other party,
and were more willing to forgive than were participants who
did not receive apologies.  Finally, full, responsibility-accepting
apologies increased the tendency of recipients to accept a par-
ticular settlement offer.  Interestingly, none of these judgments
or decisions were systematically influenced by variations in the
evidentiary rule governing apologies.
Thus, there is evidence that apologies are valued by
claimants and that apologies may help to facilitate settlement.
However, in addition to the hope that apologies may facilitate
settlement, much concern has been expressed about the possi-
bility that plaintiffs will be taken advantage of by insincere
apologies or that plaintiffs are not attentive enough to law (e.g.,
evidentiary rules) and will improvidently forfeit legal entitle-
ments.  In particular, there is concern that plaintiffs will be
“duped by communication strategies into relinquishing valu-
able legal rights, which can actually exacerbate the economic
dimension of suffering.”15 While strategic or insincere apolo-
gies may still serve some goals that plaintiffs have (e.g., serving
to acknowledge the wrong), such apologies may fail to serve
other plaintiff goals (e.g., achieving a change in behavior).
If litigants are able to detect and reject insincere apologies,
there might be less cause for concern.  This is because the per-
ceived sincerity of an apology can matter to its recipients.
People do not have the same favorable responses to explicitly
insincere apologies that they have to sincere apologies,16 and
insincere apologies may actually cause people to react nega-
tively.17 Thus, as Professor Dale Miller has argued, when
injured parties “perceive apologies to be insincere and
designed simply to ‘cool them out,’ they often react with more
rather than less indignation.”18
It is not clear, however, how well injured litigants are able
to detect and respond to
insincerity, particularly
when efforts are made to
appear sincere.19 On the
one hand, claimants are sen-
sitive to the differences in
content conveyed by apolo-
gies that accept responsibil-
ity for having caused harm
and statements that only
express sympathy for
injuries.20 Similarly, the effectiveness of apologies is influ-
enced by a variety of factors that might be seen as signals to the
sincerity of the apology.  Thus, apologies that include promises
to forbear from similar wrongful conduct in the future, apolo-
gies that are accompanied by offers of compensation, and
apologies that are properly timed all produce more favorable
reactions than apologies without these features.  These factors
may operate, at least in part, by altering the perceived sincerity
of the apology.
On the other hand, there is also evidence that people
respond favorably even to apologies that seem to be insincere
and that those who reject apologies, even unconvincing apolo-
gies, are judged less favorably than those who accept them.21
Thus, an apology “script” that contemplates that an apology
will be followed by acceptance of that apology may hold sway
over apology recipients’ behavior.  In addition, norms of reci-
procity may prescribe the acceptance of apologies.  The reci-
procity norm demands “that we should try to repay, in kind,
what another person has provided us.”22 Concessions offered
by one party to a negotiation trigger, under this norm, the
obligation to make a reciprocal concession.   If an apology
offered by a defendant is viewed as a “concession,” victims and
observers may respond favorably because they feel an obliga-
tion to respond with a reciprocal “concession” of their own.
Finally, as noted above, there is no evidence that laypeople
distinguish among apologies that are offered in the face of dif-
fering rules of evidence.23 Litigants may focus on personal fac-
tors (e.g., this person must be sorry) to the neglect of situa-
tional factors (e.g., this apology didn’t cost them anything)
when making causal attributions about the apologetic behav-
[T]here is evidence
that apologies 
are valued by
claimants and that
apologies may 
help to facilitate
settlement.
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ior.  Accordingly, they may not
be sensitive to variations in the
evidentiary value of apologies
that result from these different
evidentiary rules.
II. ATTORNEYS AND 
APOLOGIES
In any case, there is growing
empirical evidence to support
the notion that claimants tend
to respond favorably to apolo-
gies offered in settlement nego-
tiation.  The litigants themselves, however, are not the only
legal actors involved in legal-settlement decision making.
Legal negotiation is often characterized by the involvement of
attorneys in the negotiation process.  While the client, not the
attorney, is supposed to make the ultimate decision about
whether to accept or reject a settlement offer, attorneys are
likely to have considerable influence on the client’s settlement
decisions.  Clients look to their attorneys for advice and rely
on them for knowledge of the substantive rules governing the
case, their understanding of the processes involved, and their
expertise as negotiators.
Given the presence of lawyers in much legal negotiation and
their influence on client decision making, it is important to
understand the effects that apologies might have on the settle-
ment recommendations that attorneys make to their clients.
Importantly, there are a number of reasons that attorneys
might be expected to have different responses to apologies
than do laypeople. 
First, attorneys may respond differently to apologies for rea-
sons attributable to their role as agent, rather than as a party to
the underlying dispute.  Attorneys as agents are likely to be
more detached from the interpersonal aspects of the dispute as
they have neither been injured nor alleged to have done the
injuring, and the relationships at issue are not their own.  This
detachment may enable the attorney to manage the conflict in
a way that avoids the barriers to settlement that may result
from an emotionally charged atmosphere, and may also lead
the attorney to respond differently than the client would have
to the psychological and emotional aspects of the dispute and
to place different emphasis on the importance of an apology.
Moreover, recent research that has shown that observers are
more likely to distinguish between sincere and insincere apolo-
gies than are the direct recipients of apologies.  In contrast to
direct recipients, observers do not feel obligated to credit insin-
cere apologies, and when observers do reject such apologies
they do not expect to be and are not judged more harshly.24
Thus, the social constraints that may limit recipients’
responses to apologies do not appear to operate the same way
when it comes to third-party observers.
A separate set of role effects may be related to the ways in
which attorneys are compensated.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, who
are often compensated by a contingency fee, may not be
inclined to negotiate lower monetary settlements in light of
apologies, while defense attorneys, who are more likely to be
compensated by an hourly fee, may not be eager to speed set-
tlement of a case with an apology.  At the same time, however,
it is argued that contingency fee lawyers have incentives to set-
tle cases quickly, and apologies may be consistent with that
end.
Second, there is evidence that attorneys are selected and
trained to be more analytical and less emotional in their gen-
eral approach to settlement than are their clients.25 Of partic-
ular relevance to how attorneys and clients will respond to
apologies in litigation, there is evidence that lawyers may be
less influenced by concerns for equity or vindication and more
concerned with expected value analysis in responding to set-
tlement offers than are litigants.26
Third, attorneys may have a more heightened focus on pro-
tecting legal rights than do their clients.  Indeed, one study
found that the lawyers studied believed that one of the most
fundamental roles they served as legal professionals was their
service as “watchdogs” who are concerned with protecting
their clients’ legal entitlements.27 In particular, attorneys may
have a better sense of the evidentiary value of an apology and
may be more attuned to the ramifications of evidentiary rules
prohibiting or allowing apologies into evidence than are their
clients.  Thus, the evidential value of an apology and the rules
of evidence that determine an apology’s admissibility may have
a relatively greater impact on how apologies are viewed by
attorneys.
Using the pedestrian-bicycle accident scenario described
above, I examined the effects of apologies on attorney percep-
tions and judgments.28 The study asked attorneys to assume
that they represented the client described in the scenario.
Attorneys were then asked about their perceptions of the situ-
ation and to give their reservation prices, aspirations, and
assessments of the fair settlement value of the case.
Attorneys’ responses to apologies in the context of this case
paralleled the responses of laypeople in previous studies in a
number of ways.  First, attorneys assessed apologies and the
information communicated by the apologies in ways that were
similar to the assessments made by claimants—assessing full,
responsibility-accepting apologies more positively than they
did partial, sympathy-only apologies and assessing both of
these more positively than they did no apology. This suggests
that attorneys and laypeople made similar judgments about
the relative sufficiency of the different types of apologies and
24. Risen & Gilovich, supra note 21.
25. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U.
L. REV. 1337 (1997); Chris Guthrie, The Lawyers’ Philosophical Map
and the Disputant’s Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative
Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145 (2001); Leonard
L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
26. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 13.
27. Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management
of Divorce Practice, 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 149 (1994).
28. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement
Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008).
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that the apologies conveyed similar information to both
groups about the degree to which the offender thought he or
she was responsible, the offender’s regret, the degree to which
the offender would be careful in the future, the degree to
which the offender’s conduct was offensive, the degree to
which the offender respected the client, and the offender’s
moral character.
In contrast, however, apologies had differing impacts on
attorney and claimant evaluations of the offender’s responsibil-
ity, the client’s anger, their own sympathy for the offender, the
client’s inclination to forgive the offender, and their own judg-
ment that the offender should be punished.  While claimants’
evaluations tended to be more favorable to the offender fol-
lowing an apology, attorneys’ evaluations were not influenced
by apologies.
In addition, apologies influenced attorneys’ settlement
levers in ways that diverge from the ways in which apologies
have been shown to influence claimants’ settlement levers.
Recall that apologies have been shown to decrease laypeople’s
aspirations and estimates of fair settlement value under some
circumstances.  In contrast, attorneys whose clients received a
full apology set somewhat higher aspirations and made some-
what higher estimates of a fair settlement value than did attor-
neys whose clients received no apology.  For plaintiff’s attor-
neys, this pattern only held when the applicable evidentiary
rule made such apologies admissible.  That is, settlement levers
were higher only when full apologies were offered and those
apologies were not made inadmissible by the rules of evidence.
This may suggest that attorneys are more attendant to the legal
effects of the evidentiary rules than are litigants.
These findings suggest that attorneys have instincts about
the functions of apologies that are different from the ways in
which their clients react to apologies.  Such a divergence is
consistent with concerns about a disconnect between the per-
ceptions and interests of attorneys and clients.  Many com-
mentators are concerned about the risk that attorneys’ focus on
the relevant legal rules will dominate the negotiation process
and the ultimate settlement of the dispute, to the exclusion of
the non-legal interests of the parties.  In particular, many have
argued that attorneys are inclined to dismiss apologies, despite
evidence that they are valued by clients.  This may lead attor-
neys on both sides to resist settlement or to push for trial
where their clients might otherwise prefer to settle.
Conversely, attorneys may not entirely understand their
clients’ or opposing clients’ resistance to settlement in the
absence of apologies.  This may lead attorneys on both sides to
dismiss claimant requests for apology and may result in a
reduced ability to “bring [the] client along” to accept a settle-
ment.29 In addition, defense attorneys may advise their clients
against apologizing because their perspective suggests that
apologies will lead to less favorable settlement terms in addi-
tion to any increased liability risk.   Any of these disconnects
may interfere with attorneys’ ability to settle cases to the best
satisfaction of their clients.
At the same time, however,
it is possible that that the dif-
ferences in the ways in which
apologies affect claimant and
attorney settlement levers
could serve to bring attorney
and client expectations closer
in line with each other.  Many
have argued that plaintiffs
sometimes bring with them
unrealistic expectations about
the value of a case and that
plaintiffs’ attorneys work to
manage such expectations and
to “sell” proposed settlements to clients.  If this is true, then a
decrease in plaintiffs’ aspirations and a corresponding increase
in their attorneys’ aspirations could serve to bring attorney and
client aspirations closer together, at least in some cases.
Whether their differing responses to apologies ultimately
push attorneys and clients closer together or pull them apart,
such divergences are likely to affect the discussion between
attorney and client about settlement.  Thus, attorneys must
give special consideration to how to appropriately advise
clients about settlement when an apology is at issue, balancing
respect for the interests that clients have that are addressed by
apologies while also providing a perspective that helps clients
to evaluate the credibility and legal consequences of an apol-
ogy offered in the context of litigation.
III.  JUDGES AND APOLOGIES
Judges, of course, also play a role in the settlement of cases.
Thus, understanding the ways in which judges respond to
apologies is also important.  Like the attorneys described
above, judges are trained as lawyers, are skilled analysts, and
are attentive to legal rights and responsibilities.  However,
unlike attorneys who represent one side or the other, judges
are neutral participants in the dispute.
Judge Andrew Wistrich and Professors Jeff Rachlinski and
Chris Guthrie recently conducted a series of studies to exam-
ine the effect of apologies on trial judges’ decision making.30
In two studies, they asked judges to consider the details of a
case and to give their assessment of the appropriate settlement
value of the case.  In both cases, the defendants admitted
responsibility for having caused the injuries to the plaintiff,
but disputed the amount of damages at issue.  Half of the
judges were told that the defendant had offered a full, respon-
sibility-accepting apology to the plaintiff during the settlement
conference.  In both studies, an apology by the defendant did
not influence the settlement values provided by the judges.  In
a third study, the researchers examined the effect of an apology
on judges’ inclination to discharge a debtor’s bankruptcy debt.
Again, there were no effects of apology on judges’ decisions.
29. See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 24-25 & n.75 (finding that in 53% of cases that
went to trial, settlement failed due to lawyer inability to “bring
[the] client along”).
30. Andrew J. Wistrich, et al., Humans Judging Humans: Attribution
and Blame in Trial Judges (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
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31. Cynthia McPherson Frantz & Courtney Bennigson, Better Late
Than Early: The Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness, 41 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201 (2005).
32. See Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, 2 NEGOT. J. 1
(1985).
Thus, unlike other attor-
neys, judges did not appear to
inflate their assessment of the
appropriate settlement
amounts in the face of an
apology.  Conversely, unlike
claimants, judges did not
appear to moderate their
assessment of the appropriate
settlement amounts in
response to a defendant’s
apology.  One important
caveat to note in this regard is
that in each of these cases, all
judges were told that the
defendant had accepted
responsibility for having
caused the harm. To the extent that either attorneys’ expecta-
tion of a higher settlement amount or claimants’ expectation of
a lower settlement are driven by the acknowledgment of
responsibility attendant to a full apology, it remains unclear
what effect an apology might have on judges’ assessments in
cases in which liability was not already conceded.
Just as it is important for attorneys to understand how their
responses to apologies may differ from those of their clients, it
is also important for judges conducting settlement conferences
to understand how their responses to apologies may differ
from both those of the parties and their attorneys.  An aware-
ness of the ways in which apologies are valued by parties and
understood strategically by attorneys may enable judges to
assist the parties in crafting effective settlements.  For example,
a judge might simply raise the possibility of an apology with
the parties.  Or, a judge might structure a settlement confer-
ence to provide a context within which a discussion of apolo-
gies can occur, paying attention to the functions of apologies
for the various parties as well as to the legal implications of
apologies.
A judge who introduces the possibility of an apology into
the discussion ought to have an understanding of the relevant
jurisdiction’s apology provisions (see Appendix).  This knowl-
edge of the relevant law, combined with an understanding of
the potential value of apologies to claimants, the barriers to
apologizing for defendants, the potential for manipulation
posed by some apologies, and the differing perspectives of
claimants, defendants, and attorneys, can position the judge to
effectively guide the settlement discussions.
When considering whether to encourage an apology, atten-
tion ought to be paid to the context of the dispute.  For exam-
ple, while apologies may have beneficial effects regardless of
the state of the evidence, apologies may be both quite valuable
to claimants and less risky for defendants to offer when the evi-
dence pointing to liability is relatively clear.  Similarly, while
apologies are potentially useful in disputes between relative
strangers, apologies may be even more valuable and effective
when the dispute at hand involves a close or a potentially on-
going relationship—for example, a doctor-patient relationship,
a family relationship, or an employment relationship.  Initial
conversations might carefully explore the parties’ willingness
to offer or to receive apologies.  The judge can listen for signals
that one or both parties would be receptive to such an
exchange.  It may be wise to tentatively explore the possibility
of an apology with the defendant before raising the matter
directly with the plaintiff to avoid disappointment if it turns
out that the defendant is adamantly opposed to offering one.
Consideration might also be given to whether it might be
appropriate and productive for both parties to apologize to
each other.  
In addition, appreciation of what makes an apology effective
can be useful in guiding such discussions.  Apologies that
accept responsibility for having caused harm are more likely to
have positive effects and to have bigger impacts than are
expressions of sympathy.  Apologies may be more effective
when offered directly by a defendant to a plaintiff than when
mediated through their attorneys.  The timing of an apology is
also an important consideration.  However, the effects of tim-
ing on the effectiveness of apologies are complex.  On one
hand, an apology offered quickly after an injury has occurred
may prevent an injury from developing into a grievance or
conflict.  On the other hand, an apology may ring hollow if it
is offered too quickly and without reflection.  By the time of a
settlement conference, the possibility of an early apology may
have passed.  Nonetheless, it may be possible to jump start the
negotiations with an apology that is offered early in the dis-
cussions.  Importantly, however, experimental studies have
found that apologies can be most satisfactory when the recipi-
ent has had a chance to express his concerns and the apolo-
gizer has been able to articulate an understanding of the nature
of the offense and its consequences.31 Thus, the judge might
attempt to structure the discussion leading up to an apology
with this in mind.  Alternately, if it is not possible to secure an
apology before reaching a financial settlement, it might be
appropriate for a judge to introduce the possibility of arrang-
ing for an apology that would come after the financial terms of
the deal have been agreed to in principle.32
Judges might also consider mediation as a process within
which apologies can be usefully addressed.  Because many
states provide that statements made in mediation are not
admissible in subsequent legal proceedings, defendants and
defense attorneys may be more comfortable offering apologies
in mediation.  Moreover, the mediation process was designed,
in part, to allow parties to play a central role in the negotiation
process and to determine for themselves the norms that would
govern the resolution of their dispute.  
In mediation, the parties themselves can participate directly
in the settlement negotiation discussions, assisted by the medi-
ator and while still being advised by their attorneys.  A skilled
mediator may be able to help create the opportunity for a dis-
cussion among the disputants that involves acknowledgment
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and apology, to facilitate that discussion, and to facilitate the
negotiation that may need to occur between attorney and
client.   The process allows disputants to introduce non-mon-
etary factors—such as apology—into the discussion.  And, the
attorneys are still available to advise clients as to the legal con-
sequences of apologies or particular settlement proposals.
Mediation, then, can provide either party with an occasion to
communicate to the other side their desire to give or to receive
an apology and can be a process that is designed to facilitate
such conversations.
CONCLUSION
Apologies may have a role to play in the settlement of legal
disputes.  Claimants, attorneys, and judges, however, respond
to apologies made in the context of litigation in different ways.
Judges who understand the nuanced effects that apologies
have on the decision making of parties and their attorneys, and
who are aware that their own responses may differ from both,
will be in a better position to effectively assist in the resolution
of legal disputes.
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APPENDIX:  STATE APOLOGY STATUTES
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2010 Annual Conference
Denver, Colorado
Westin Tabor Center
October 3-8
$205 single/double
2011 Midyear Meeting
Hilton Head, South Carolina
Westin Hilton Head Island
April 14-16
$209 single/double
2011 Annual Conference
San Diego, California
Westin Gaslamp
September 11-16
$199 single/double
2013 Annual Conference
Kohala Coast, Hawaii
The Fairmont Orchid
September 22-27
$219 single/double
